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University of Amsterdam
Two studies examined people’s aesthetic experiences of art in the laboratory and the museum. The
theoretical framework guiding the research was based on the Mirror Model of Art (Tinio, 2013), which
proposes that the process of artistic creation and artistic reception mirror each other. Study 1 used a
think-aloud protocol to assess people’s natural and spontaneous reactions while looking at art. Study 2
examined whether presenting information about an artwork in a certain order (lower-order to higherorder information or higher-order to lower-order information) enhances aspects of the aesthetic experience and retention of information about art. Studies 1 and 2 were each conducted both in a laboratory and
in a museum. The results replicate those of previous research that showed that the aesthetic experience
of art is enhanced in the museum as compared with the laboratory setting. In addition, the results show
that the effects of presenting information in a certain order (lower-order to higher-order information)
depend on the context of presentation: museum visitors were better able to remember information about
art than laboratory participants. Overall, the findings suggest that the Mirror Model is a good representation of how people naturally process art, but that certain aspects of the model could be optimized.
Keywords: aesthetics, creativity, psychology of art, art education, museums

reception “mirror” each other. From the creation side, an artist
starts by exploring core themes and ideas for a potential artwork.
After an idea, or a set of related ideas, is selected as the “foundation” of the work, the artist subsequently expands the work, adding
more elements and materials to the foundation and at times adapting the initial idea to take situational demands into account. Finally, finishing touches are added, thus completing the art creation
process. From the receptive side, perceivers first encounter the
surface features of an artwork, and then, after their initial attention
is captured, move forward toward the exploration of the general
structure of the work (e.g., composition of a painting) as well as
the identification of depicted elements. Finally, they attempt to
understand the artwork and grasp the concepts and ideas that
underlie and that may have motivated its creation. Thus, when
Mark Rothko claimed that “the people who weep before my
pictures are having the same religious experience I had when I
painted them” (as quoted by Stoker, 2008, p. 90), he may have
been capturing the essence of the Mirror Model of Art.
Through the connection between the creation and reception
processes, the Mirror Model extends previous models that have
selectively focused on either the reception or creation side of art.
This selective focus on one or the other is one of the current issues
in the field of psychology of art, as discussed by Vartanian (2014).
That said, most of the models accounting for the aesthetic experience (Chatterjee, 2004, 2010; Leder et al., 2004; Leder & Nadal,
2014; Locher et al., 2010), including the Mirror Model, describe
the art reception process in similar ways. The first stage mainly
involves automatic visual processing (of, e.g., visual complexity
and color). The second stage involves more detailed processing

On any given day, approximately 2.5 million people in the
United States visit museums (American Alliance of Museums,
n.d.). When people are asked to evaluate their visit on a scale from
1 to 10, with 10 reflecting a high level of appreciation, average
ratings of 9 and higher are common (e.g., Smith & Wolf, 1996;
Smith, Wolf, & O’Brien, 1996). Thus, a visit to a museum seems
to be a valuable and meaningful experience that many people
engage in frequently. In addition, informal experiences with art
also occur in everyday settings, such as when reading art books,
seeing pictures in magazines, and looking at art posters. To understand the aesthetic experiences that people have when they are
interacting with art, several models of the aesthetic experience
have been proposed (Chatterjee, 2004, 2010; Leder, Belke, Oeberst, & Augustin, 2004; Leder & Nadal, 2014; Locher, Overbeeke, & Wensveen, 2010; Tinio, 2013).
One of these models is the Mirror Model of Art (Tinio, 2013).
The Mirror Model postulates that artistic creation and aesthetic
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during which the visitor might try to evaluate the expertise of the
artist or identify issues of an art historical nature, such as the style
of the work (e.g., Impressionism). During this process, people may
draw on their personal taste and art expertise as well as contextual
information such as labels describing an artwork. Therefore, they
are drawing from their knowledge base to make sense of the work.
Finally, the third stage involves interpretation— either in an artspecific or self-referential way—and evaluation of the work. The
general idea is that people use the information they gathered in
the previous stages to arrive at these interpretations and evaluations. However, what distinguishes the Mirror Model from
other models is that whereas other models postulate a correspondence between particular characteristics of the artwork and
the viewing process, the Mirror Model additionally postulates a
direct correspondence between artistic creation and artistic reception. This idea is illustrated in Figure 1. This unique feature
of the Mirror Model helps to open a more integrative line of
research that combines art making and art viewing rather than
studying one or the other in isolation as has been common
practice (Vartanian, 2014).
The present research is a direct empirical test of aspects of the
Mirror Model of Art (Tinio, 2013). First, the research will investigate whether the model accurately represents how people naturally process art. Second, it will investigate if presenting information to people viewing art in a manner that corresponds to the
order implied by the model could have specific benefits for
viewers, such as enhanced aesthetic experiences and better
memory of information associated with art. Although most
previous research has focused on describing and understanding
the art-viewing process, this study investigates the potential
benefits (i.e., enhanced aesthetic experience and information
retention) of following a certain order of presenting information
to people interacting with art. Therefore, aesthetic reception is
examined in light of what is known about artistic creation as
described by the model.

The Present Research
We examined two main research questions: (a) To what extent
does the model represent how people naturally process art? and
(b) Does presenting information in a manner that corresponds to
the model (i.e., the steps described by the model as being part of
the natural viewing process) have specific benefits to the viewers?
Benefits in this case are considered as enhancement of the aesthetic
experience and an increase in information retention. Information
retention refers to the amount of information about the artwork
that people remember.
These questions were addressed in two studies— one qualitative
and the other quantitative. Through the use of a mixed-method
approach, we hoped to gain a deeper and more detailed understanding of how people process art and to optimize experimental
control while maintaining high ecological validity as well as to be
able to substantiate findings by combining one approach with the
other.
In Study 1, we investigated the extent to which the model
represents how people naturally process art. Participants were
asked to spontaneously report their experience while they viewed
an artwork. One half of the participants performed this task in a
museum and the other half in the laboratory. In Study 2, we used
a 2 (information presentation in accordance with the model vs.
information presentation not in accordance with the model; from
this point on, we refer to these as model-consistent order vs.
model-inconsistent order, respectively) ⫻ 2 (museum vs. laboratory context) design to investigate if presenting information in
accordance with the stages of the model affects the art perception
process. We hypothesized that using a model-consistent order will
lead to a higher level of information retention and an enhanced
aesthetic experience as compared with using a model-inconsistent
order. The idea behind this is the notion that if the model represents a natural way of processing artworks, following this natural
structure should enhance the aesthetic experience and increase
information retention.

Figure 1. The Mirror Model of Art. Image derived from Tinio (2013). See the online article for the color
version of this figure.
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In addition to the presentation of information, we also accounted
for two factors known to influence the aesthetic experience: art
expertise and context of viewing. Regarding the former, several
studies have shown differences in the processing of art stimuli
between people with high as compared with low art expertise (e.g.,
Augustin & Leder, 2006; Cupchik & Laszlo, 1992; Winston &
Cupchik, 1992). For example, Cupchik and Laszlo (1992) found
that naïve viewers (people low in art expertise) typically use a
content-related processing style whereas art experts use a more
style-related processing style. Therefore, we included a measure of
art expertise to control for this factor.
The inclusion of both museum and laboratory contexts addresses an ongoing concern in the field of psychology of art.
Research has shown differences in how artworks are processed and
evaluated based on whether they are viewed in the museum or
laboratory, with more enhanced aesthetic experiences generally
found in the museum context (e.g., Brieber, Nadal, Leder, &
Rosenberg, 2014; Locher, Smith, & Smith, 1999; Tinio, Smith, &
Smith, 2014). Including context as a factor allows us to replicate
these effects as well as to test if the effects of the model are robust
across two distinct contexts.

Study 1
Method
Participants. Study 1 included 20 participants (13 males, 7 females; Mean agemuseum ⫽ 43.4 years, SD ⫽ 9.3 and Mean agelaboratory ⫽
20.1 years, SD ⫽ 1.4). Ten participants were undergraduate students at Montclair State University who received course credit for
their participation and who were tested in the laboratory; the other
10 were visitors to the Queens Museum in New York.
We measured the participants’ level of expertise using the
Aesthetic Fluency Scale (Smith & Smith, 2006; see Appendix),
which consists of 10 items (␣ ⫽ .90). Smith and Smith (2006)
define artistic fluency as “the knowledge base concerning art that
facilitates aesthetic experience in individuals.” Participants indicate their familiarity with certain art concepts (e.g., Fauvism,
Chinese Scrolls, Abstract Expressionism) on a 0 – 4 scale. The
level of art expertise (M ⫽ 1.4) was relatively low in our sample.
Materials and procedure. All participants viewed the same
artwork, The Senate by William Gropper (c. 1950; see Figure 2).
The museum participants viewed the actual artwork and the laboratory group viewed a printed, high-resolution version of the
artwork that was approximately the same size as the original. This
painting was chosen because it is a conventional type of artwork
(i.e., medium-sized figurative painting). In addition, reproductions
of this painting cannot easily be found on the Internet, and Gropper
is a lesser known artist. These factors contributed to reducing
participants’ potential familiarity with the artwork.1 Because of the
novelty of the research design within the field of psychological
aesthetics—the use of mixed methods in both the laboratory and
museum—we decided to focus data collection on the Gropper
work.
This allowed for extensive and in-depth data collection that
addresses the two main research questions within a reasonable
research design. However, we do understand that other artworks
should be included in future studies.

267

Participants spontaneously reported their experience while looking at the artwork. All participants received the following instructions:
We would like you to look at this artwork and approach/view it as you
normally would. At the same time, we would like you to describe your
experience (thoughts, emotions) while you are looking at the artwork
by talking into an audio recording device. Please try and be as
accurate and detailed as possible when verbalizing your thought
process and experience when looking at the work. You can take as
much time as you want. After you are finished, we would like you to
fill out a questionnaire.

After the think-aloud procedure, participants completed the aesthetic fluency scale and reported demographic information.
One half of the participants performed this task in a museum and
the other half in the laboratory. Visitors to the Queens Museum
(Queens, NY) were asked to participate as they entered the gallery
and approached the artwork. When they expressed interest in
participating, they received an informed consent form. Because
foot traffic was generally low in the gallery where the museum
participants completed the task, distraction from other visitors was
minimal.
The procedure for the laboratory study was similar to that used
in the museum study. In addition, the poster reproduction was
hung on the wall of the laboratory to increase the similarity of
presentation between the two contexts. However, to ensure a
difference in context between the laboratory and the museum, the
corresponding label and wall-text that accompanied the original
work were not made available to the laboratory participants. This
also has the benefit of making the laboratory condition more
similar to previous aesthetic research conducted in the laboratory,
where often no label is provided.
Data analysis. Participants’ verbatim reports were transcribed
and subsequently thematically coded using a recursive process in
which the three aesthetic reception stages of the Mirror Model
served as guidelines for organizing emergent themes from the data.
Stage I represented basic, low-level processing. Such processing
involves automatic early processing of shapes and colors as well as
initial responses to the artwork. Stage II represented structural
processing and use of knowledge (both general and art-related
knowledge). Structural processing involves an intermediate level
of processing that is related to the content of the work and how
different elements in the artwork are related to one another. Use of
knowledge involves memory-based processing that helps with
such actions as categorizing the work in terms of style and drawing
from personal knowledge and experiences to identify what is being
depicted. Stage III represented the themes interpretation and aesthetic judgment, which are higher-order responses. Interpretation
is related to the “meaning-making” process in which people interpret the work, and aesthetic judgment involves people’s overall
evaluation of the work.
The coding was performed by two coders, one of which was the
principal investigator and the other a research assistant unfamiliar
with the hypotheses. The set of transcripts from the museum
participants was first coded. Then the coders discussed any differ1
All participants also completed a mix-and-match task, the results of
which will be reported elsewhere.
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Figure 2. William Gropper, “The Senate,” c.1950, New York, NY: Private Collection. See the online article
for the color version of this figure.

ences in coding until the final coding was agreed upon. The same
process was applied to the set of transcripts from the laboratory
participants.
All transcripts were organized by each coder according to the
three stages. This was done to assess the extent to which the
transcripts reflected the three-stage structure depicted in the model.
The division of stages was based on “semantic shifts.” For example, if a participant first talked about the use of color in the work
and then shifted attention to talk about the content of the work,
then this would be seen as a change in focus and hence serve as a
dividing line between one stage and the next. The length and
amount of utterances corresponding to the stages were allowed to
vary. For example, it is possible that Stage I would be shorter (in
time/amount of utterances) than Stage II or Stage III. It is also
possible that transcripts of participants were divided in, for example, two or four stages rather than three stages.

Results
With the exception of two participants who showed two stages
of processing—with both showing no signs of the first stage of
processing—all participants showed three discernable stages of
processing. Therefore, our discussion of the results will consecutively present Stages I–III. The average duration of the verbatim
reports was comparable (Mmuseum ⫽ 89.7 sec, SD ⫽ 33.3 and
Mlaboratory ⫽ 103.4 sec, SD ⫽ 39.1). The means do not include two
outliers who were laboratory participants who exhibited durations
of 902 and 285 sec.
Stage I (basic, low-level responses). Because this first stage
involves early automatic processing, we assumed that the number
of reports regarding this stage would be lower than the other
stages. For reports on this stage to occur, participants would need
to consciously reflect on these automatic processes, which would
be a challenging task.
Our results confirmed this assumption because there was a small
number of people making statements about their initial responses
to the work, such as (dis)liking or (un)interest. Eight people (40%)
did not comment on Stage I themes at all. When people did
mention such themes, they often combined them with the later
stage of aesthetic judgment. In this later stage, people make an
overall judgment about the work. In contrast, initial responses
represent a more automatic response to the work. Stage I themes

occurring at a later stage can be better understood as part of a
conceptual overlap between aesthetic judgment, as a subsequent
conscious evaluation of a work, and initial evaluative responses,
which occur automatically. Furthermore, there were six people
who did not make statements about any of the themes corresponding to the first stage.2 It is especially notable that five of these
participants participated in the laboratory. Because a great deal of
the visual detail that is processed in this stage is inherently more
present in the genuine artwork than the reproduction that the
laboratory participants viewed, the lack of visual detail in the
laboratory setting may help to explain this finding.
In sum, our findings concerning Stage I reflect the fact that it is
difficult for participants to consciously reflect and report on automatic processes. In addition, when there is a lower level of visual
detail (i.e., there is less information about the stimulus) for the
participants to process, it is even more difficult for participants to
consciously reflect and report on these themes. This leads to a
decrease in how often such themes are reported on in the laboratory, where there are fewer visual details available as compared
with the museum.
Stage II (structural and memory-related processing).
Taking into consideration the finding that reports on the first stage
are difficult and rare, one of the first aspects of an artwork that
people explicitly talk about is the content of the work. Many
participants start with “I see,” “so I look at this piece,” and then
continue with, for example, “. . . a man shouting.” Therefore,
participants showed signs of starting with a more memory-based,
structural type of processing rather than with a detailed and automatic processing as the model would prescribe. We have named
this a “motivation to understand,” with people starting with naming what they see (content-wise) to understand what they are
looking at. This is in line with Russell’s (2003) “effort after
meaning” theory, which postulates that part of the pleasure derived
2
The reader may wonder how this should be understood in combination
with the finding that only two participants showed two discernable stages.
To understand this more fully, we refer the reader to the third paragraph of
the section on Stage III. In this paragraph, a looping pattern is described.
In this pattern, Stages I and III are thematically the same. This leads to the
possibility of having three discernable stages while at the same time having
no report on themes corresponding to the first stage as conceptualized by
the Mirror Model.
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from engaging with an artwork stems from making a successful
interpretation of it and discerning the artist’s message. This idea
may be seen in several utterances that were not directly consistent
with the model. For example, one participant stated, “I have to
read the text on the wall first,” after which the participant
proceeded to do just that before looking at the painting. An
instance of a combination of both of these types of utterances is
a participant who stated “the first thing I see . . . I don’t know
what I’m looking at.”
Because of this motivation to understand, many participants
reported a high level of structural processing (utterances related to
an intermediate level of processing that is related to the content of
the work and how different elements are related to one another).
Another frequently occurring theme was interpretation (a theme
the model describes as characteristic of the last stage). All participants made statements about structural processing and interpretation. There were even two participants who only spoke about these
two themes and did not make statements about any of the other
themes. In addition, a combination of these themes was frequent,
especially when a statement included clear aspects of both themes
but could not be separated into two separate parts (for example,
because of the way it was phrased). What seems to be happening
is that people mention a structural aspect of the work and then
interpret that aspect immediately; conversely, they give an interpretation of the work and then provide an example of a structural
aspect that led them to the interpretation. Thus, people seem to be
continuously looping through Stages II and III in an attempt to
understand the artwork. For example, one participant said, “You
sorta get that conflict in the people . . . [interpretation] the tension
in their clothes and their faces really well [structural processing].”
Another example would be a participant who said:
. . . it looks like the main guy’s ehhmm telling a speech . . . [structural
processing] that most of the other people don’t care about—
[interpretation] some of them are really just . . . really bored or ehmm
really don’t care [interpretation], we have two men gossiping in the
bottom left corner [structural processing] ehmm . . . we have one, two,
three men that are about to fall asleep. [structural processing] The
gentlemen in the middle with the blue tie looks like he’s about to walk
away [structural processing/interpretation].

To quantify this finding, we investigated transitions between the
themes. For example, in the quote “. . . it looks like the main guy’s
ehmmm telling a speech . . . [structural processing] that most of the
other people don’t care about—[interpretation]” shows a transition
from Stage II to Stage III. If people really loop between Stages II
and III, then transitions from Stage II to Stage III (and vice versa)
should make up the largest proportion of transitions. To investigate
this, we first calculated the proportion of such transitions per
participant to adjust for variation in length of verbatim reports. We
then took the average proportion for each transition. Our results
confirm that people loop between Stage II and Stage III. Transitions from Stage II to Stage III made up, on average, 36% of all
transitions; transitions from Stage III to Stage II made up, on
average, 33%. Together they make up 69% of all transitions. All
other transitions (Stage III to Stage I, Stage I to Stage III, Stage II
to Stage I, and Stage I to Stage II) each made up less than 10%, on
average.
These results are best explained by the finding of Cupchik and
Laszlo (1992), who showed that people low in art expertise (naïve
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viewers) typically use a content-related processing approach
whereas experts use a more style-focused processing approach.
Our sample was low in art expertise. Thus, the fact that we found
a mainly content-related processing style seems to be consistent
with Cupchik and Laszlo’s (1992) findings. There were only three
participants who could be considered as “experts” in our sample,
and all three of these experts were participants in the museum.
These experts showed a more style-focused processing approach,
as would be expected based on Cupchik and Laszlo’s (1992)
findings. This style-focused processing approach was evident by
their use of art-related knowledge as a starting point for their
viewing process. One participant stated,
I’m looking at William Gropper’s supposedly famous painting of the
Senate [use of art knowledge] from I assume the early fifties [use of
art knowledge]. I know enough from the background to know that
Gropper was in front of the McCarthy Committee, pled the 5th and
was blacklisted for it [use of art knowledge].

For another participant, a style-related processing approach was
even clearer. This participant first summed up what they knew
about the artwork and consequently talked about the painting
technique that the painter used in the work:
Well ehh it was painted in 1950 [use of art knowledge]. It’s certainly
of its time [use of art knowledge]. It looks very American . . . [use of
art knowledge]. It looks abstract [use of art knowledge]. There is an
illustrative element to it uhm . . . [use of art knowledge]. The
brushstrokes are very precise [detailed processing]. They almost look
like pastels [detailed processing] or . . . some sort of crayon instead of
oil paint [detailed processing]. The color palette is very mid-century
[use of art knowledge].

One of the experts was the participant described above, who
started by reading the wall-text. It seems that this participant was
lacking in art knowledge about this particular artist and because
she is used to having this as a starting point of processing, she used
the knowledge available in the museum context. Furthermore, this
participant was the only person in our entire sample to comment on
the use of line in the piece as well as to make several other
statements related to use of art knowledge, clearly showing a
style-focused processing approach.
There was also a difference in how laboratory versus museum
participants attempted to understand the work. Museum participants made use of the museum context (e.g., by referring to the
wall-text); thus, they used a form of external art knowledge inherent in the context to aid their understanding of the work. On the
other hand, laboratory participants were deprived of this context—
there was no artwork label or wall-text, as is common in most
research on aesthetic responses to artworks. For this sample, there
was a higher occurrence of use of personal knowledge in an effort
to understand and interpret the artwork. For example, several
participants mentioned that the work reminded them of a classroom. Considering the fact that all laboratory participants were
students, this is a clear instance of use of personal knowledge.
Both strategies reflect memory-based processing as described by
the model as well as the importance of context.
In sum, our findings regarding Stage II show that naïve viewers,
who made up most of our sample, showed a content-related processing approach, which is in correspondence with Cupchik and
Laszlo’s (1992) findings. This content-related approach seems to
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promote a “loop” between Stage II and Stage III. We have explained this phenomenon through the concept of a motivation to
understand—participants want to understand what they are looking
at when they are looking at art. Therefore, naïve viewers who have
limited art-related knowledge focus on content-related aspects of
the work. Thus, they look at a specific structural aspect of a work
and interpret it and then proceed to the next aspect to be interpreted; alternatively, they give their interpretation and then point to
aspects of the work to explain how they obtained that interpretation. Likewise, when art-related knowledge is available to them
through, for example, the museum context, they will use this
external knowledge in their interpretation process. If this knowledge is not available, then they will use their own personal knowledge to interpret the work. These findings can be loosely related to
the stages of aesthetic development as proposed by Housen (2007).
In our sample, people started by mentioning what they were
seeing, which is similar to Housen’s “Accountive Stage” (Stage I).
Then they were motivated to understand the work and used personal and/or art related knowledge to interpret the work. In this
case, “The Constructive Stage” (Stage II) of Housen can be seen as
reflecting the use of personal knowledge and “The Classifying
Stage” (Stage III) as reflecting the use of art-related knowledge.
From a developmental point of view, it makes sense to conceptualize the classifying stage as later in development than the constructive stage because it is only possible to engage with art-related
knowledge processing when one has attained a sufficient amount
of such knowledge. However, the way in which these two types of
knowledge are used during aesthetic experiences may be similar, if
not the same, which is apparent from our data and is conceptualized in the Mirror Model. The “Interpretive” (Stage IV) and
“Re-Creative” (Stage V) stages of Housen’s aesthetic development
model should then, in theory, be connected to Stage III of the
Mirror Model.
Stage III: (higher level processing: meaning-making). The
themes of aesthetic emotion and judgment occurred frequently at
the end of the aesthetic encounter, as the model describes. For
example, three participants ended their viewing by making aesthetic judgment statements. All three of them talked about the
content-related aspects (and their corresponding interpretations)
and then concluded their viewing by saying “It’s pretty cool,” “It’s
very eye-catching,” or “Well, actually, it’s a really nice piece . . .”
Likewise, one participant concluded her viewing by making an
aesthetic emotion statement: “So . . . it’s pretty depressing hahaha,
it’s a pretty depressing painting . . . , pretty dark . . .” Thus, it
seems that the themes of aesthetic emotion and aesthetic judgment
tend to occur at the end of the aesthetic encounter. After participants have “finished” their content-related processing, they tend to
turn to their judgment of the work or state how the work made
them feel.
There were some instances where aesthetic emotion was the first
thing people mentioned. Although this was a rare occurrence, it
seems notable that for some participants the initial emotional
reaction seemed to be central and would preside over pure contentrelated processing. For example, one participant said, “It gives you
a feel of hostility, makes me feel uncomfortable . . .” Afterward,
this participant also followed the motivation to understand pattern
previously described by saying, “I mean they’re all arguing
through something . . . [interpretation], their expressions are not

pleasing . . . [structural processing] they all seem upset or concerned about something [interpretation].”
As mentioned, people made many interpretation statements,
mainly as part of a content-processing approach. However, some
participants started this process by giving their initial interpretation
of the work, then moved on to discuss the structural aspects of the
work that led them to their initial interpretation, and then concluded with a final interpretation— hence following a “looping”
pattern. For example, one participant started by saying that “It
looks like the main guy’s ehhmm telling a speech . . . [structural
processing]—that most of the other people don’t care about [interpretation]” and ended with saying
they seem as if they’re all done listening to the speech [interpretation]
while the gentleman in the middle is tired of giving the speech
[interpretation] . . . but yeah you’ve two men with sour faces on as if
they’re agreeing with him and mad at the other side, the other party,
that he’s against [interpretation] or, just upset that they have to be
there [interpretation]. . . .

In these cases, the interpretation statements seem to be more
similar to the aesthetic judgment and aesthetic emotion statements
occurring in Stage III; that is, in all of these instances, people have
processed the work and then made a final summary, just as
described by the model. Likewise, another participant, already
mentioned earlier as ending with aesthetic emotion, also displayed
this looping pattern. She actually began her viewing by stating
“It’s definitely eerie . . . [aesthetic emotion/interpretation]” and
mentioned in the beginning that “there’s definitely a sense of
uhmm, dead or something ominous, not very harmonious, going on
[aesthetic emotion/interpretation].”
In sum, we found that the topic of interpretation can either be
part of the content-related processing style as described in the
previous section or it can be used in the way the model describes—
namely, as a final conclusion of the viewing process. Thus, the
model seems to be correct in stating that in the last stage of
viewing, people end with meaning-making, which can be an interpretation of the work and an aesthetic judgment or an aesthetic
emotional reaction. In terms of the aesthetic development model
from Housen (2007), it should be apparent that her “Interpretive”
stage (Stage IV) is connected to our theme of interpretation and
that both reflect an interpretation of the artwork. Stage V, the
“Re-Creative” stage of Housen (2007), involves engaging with a
particular artwork multiple times and with art in general over a
longer period of time. Therefore, it is apparent that our results that
only apply to a one-time viewing of a work might not directly
speak of this stage. However, it can be postulated that such
extended engagement with art could lead to a deeper level of
processing across the stages of the Mirror Model.

Discussion
The results of Study 1 suggest that the model is a relatively good
reflection of how people naturally process art. Our findings show
that conscious report on automatic visual processing is increasingly difficult when there is a lower level of visual detail, which
leads to fewer instances of these themes being reported in the
laboratory setting (fewer visual details) as compared with the
museum setting (more visual details). Our findings also show a
correspondence with earlier research, in particular that of Cupchik
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and Laszlo (1992), who showed that naïve viewers demonstrate a
content-related processing style and expert viewers a more stylefocused processing style. This is in line with the Mirror Model,
which assumes that both could take place in Stage II.
We have introduced the concept of a motivation to understand to
explain this finding. Participants are motivated to know what they
are looking at when viewing an artwork, and they use the resources
available to them to reach a level of understanding. Therefore,
participants in the museum context will use the external art knowledge available to them and participants in the laboratory will use
their own personal memories. Although the model describes these
processes as happening in Stage II, our findings provide evidence
that participants seem to loop through Stages II and III in their
attempt to understand the work. Although the model does not
exclude the possibility of people moving back and forth through
the stages, it would be an improvement if this process could be
made explicit (such as in the model of Leder et al., 2004). This
does not necessarily mean that the general “flow” of the model
from Stage I to Stage III is incorrect, but instead that people do not
always follow this structure in a linear fashion. Furthermore, this
concept of looping should also be implemented in the art-making
side of the model. It is likely that such a loop could also be found
during art production. As artists expand and adapt their work in
Stage II of the model, it is likely that they revisit the first stage
where they developed their initial idea and theme for the work as
they proceeded along. Because the model describes a correspondence between the art-making and art-viewing processes, this loop
would have to be implemented in both sides of the model.
In addition, it would seem appropriate if the Mirror Model were
to explicitly include what we have called a motivation to understand. This motivation to understand is a central tenet of the effort
after meaning theory by Russell (2003). It is already implicit in the
Mirror Model and in similar models in the literature. For example,
the model by Leder et al. (2004) includes the notion that exposure
to art provides the perceiver with a challenging situation to classify, understand, and cognitively master. However, the model does
not explicitly incorporate the notion of motivation. One way to
explicitly incorporate this idea is to acknowledge the presence of
a “first glance” in which people take in the artwork. In general,
people who are in a museum will glance at many art pieces but will
only stop and look at a couple of works for a longer period of time.
This decision to stop and look at a work can be seen as people
being motivated to understand the work, or in terms of the Leder
et al. (2004) model, to engage with the challenge before them and
go through all of the stages of the art-viewing process (see also
Smith & Smith, 2001). Thus, this first glance is a prestage, in
which only people motivated to understand will proceed and will
complete the entire art-viewing process as described by aesthetic
experience models (e.g., Leder et al., 2004; Tinio, 2013). This
notion of a first glance or a two-stage process of art viewing is not
new, and a review of the evidence for this two-stage process of art
perception can be found in Locher (2015). In terms of the Mirror
Model, it seems likely that Stage I would represent this first glance
because it involves the early and automatic processes that can
occur in a mere glance at an artwork. As for the art production part
of the Mirror Model, it seems fitting to assume that just as viewers
glance at many different artworks and only look at a few, artists
have many different ideas, but only a few could be worked on at
any given time. Therefore, one can draw a parallel between the
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glances of the viewer that are “discarded” or “set aside” (purposefully or not) and the ideas of the artist that are subjected to similar
outcomes.
Finally, in Study 1, we found that although interpretation can be
part of a content-related processing approach, it can also be used
in the way the model describes—namely, as a final conclusion of
the viewing experience. Thus, the model seems to be correct in
stating that in the last stage of viewing, people end with meaningmaking.
Using qualitative methodology in both museum and laboratory
contexts, Study 1 has given us a deep understanding of the extent
to which the Mirror Model reflects how people naturally process
art. However, the study did not directly address our second main
question of whether presenting information in a way that corresponds to the model has benefits for art viewers. This question was
investigated in Study 2.

Study 2
Method
Participants. Study 2 included 130 participants. Seven participants (5%) were excluded because of procedural reasons such
as failure to complete the dependent measures or ignoring task
instructions. Therefore, we had 123 participants in total (42 males,
78 females, 3 unreported gender; Mean agemuseum ⫽ 38.9 years,
SD ⫽ 15.7 and Mean agelaboratory ⫽ 20.7 years, SD ⫽ 2.9). Sixty
of these participants were tested in the laboratory and the other 63
in the museum. As with Study 1, laboratory participants were
students at Montclair State University who received course credit
for their participation. Museum participants were visitors to the
Queens Museum. The recruitment procedure was the same as in
Study 1.
Procedure. Study 2 used a 2 (model-consistent order vs.
model-inconsistent order) ⫻ 2 (museum vs. laboratory context)
design. Participants were presented with information about the
painting through an audio guide. In the model-consistent order
condition, information was structured to correspond to the structure that the model describes. In the model-inconsistent order
condition, information was structured to follow the opposite order.3 Museum participants listened to the audio guide while looking at the artwork used in Study 1 (The Senate by William
Gropper, c. 1950) whereas laboratory participants listened to the
same audio guide while looking at a high-resolution reproduction
of the artwork presented on a computer monitor. After viewing the
artwork, both groups completed the aesthetic experience questionnaire and the art expertise questionnaire. They then reported demographic information and finally completed the information retention task.4
Materials. To measure aesthetic experience, we used an
adapted version of the Aesthetic Experience Scale (Silvia & Nusbaum, 2011). The original scale asked participants to report how
often they had experienced each of the 10 items (e.g., “feel
absorbed and immersed”) for a specific aesthetic category (e.g.,
3
The full text of the audio guide for both conditions is included in the
Appendix.
4
All participants also completed a mix-and-match task the results, of
which will be reported elsewhere.
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“listening to music”). In our adapted version, we asked participants
to rate, on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much), the extent to which they experienced each of the items
(e.g., “feel absorbed and immersed”) while looking at the artwork.
The scale was reliable with ␣ ⫽ .86.
To assess information retention, participants answered 10 questions with regard to the information they received via the audio
guide. Questions were yes-or-no questions assessing if people
remembered specific pieces of information. An example is “Do
you remember that the artwork was oil on canvas?” Some of the
questions asked about information people did not receive (foils) to
assess real information retention and not response biases toward
answering “yes.” In the task instructions, people were informed
that some of the statements might be false. These items were
reverse scored before the analysis. Art expertise was measured in
the same way as in Study 1 using the Aesthetic Fluency Scale
(Smith & Smith, 2006). All of these scales can be found in the
Appendix.

Results
For all analyses, mean scores were entered for the dependent
variables, information retention and aesthetic experience, and for
the art expertise covariate. Our laboratory sample did not vary
from our museum sample in gender (p ⬎ .05); however, the two
samples did differ in age (p ⬍ .05). Therefore, we added age as a
covariate in all of our analyses. We conducted two two-way
analyses of covariance (ANCOVAs) to investigate the effects of
model order and context on the two dependent variables. In the
first analysis, we investigated the effects of model order (consistent vs. inconsistent) and context (museum vs. laboratory) on
aesthetic experience while controlling for art expertise and age.
One participant, who was identified as an extreme outlier
(score ⬎2 times the upper quartile), was excluded. Results showed
a significant main effect of context, F(4, 115)5 ⫽ 4.69, p ⫽ .03,
2 ⫽ .04. Participants in the museum (M ⫽ 3.7) scored higher on
aesthetic experience than participants in the laboratory (M ⫽ 3.1).
There was no effect of model order, F(4, 115) ⫽ 2.32, p ⫽ .13,
2 ⫽ .02, and consistent with our hypothesis, there was no interaction between model order and context, F(4, 115) ⫽ .17, p ⫽ .68,
2 ⫽ .002. A plot of these results is found in Figure 3, left panel.
In the second analysis, we investigated the effects of model
order (consistent vs. inconsistent) and context (museum vs. laboratory) on information retention while controlling for art expertise
and age. There was no effect of model order, F(4, 117) ⫽ 1.34,
p ⫽ .25, 2 ⫽ .01, or context, F(4, 117) ⫽ 3.41, p ⫽ .07, 2 ⫽ .03.
However, there was a significant interaction between model order
and context, F(4, 117) ⫽ 5.98, p ⬍ .05, 2 ⫽ .05. Participants in
the museum remembered more information in the modelconsistent condition (M ⫽ .77) than in the model-inconsistent
condition (M ⫽ .75). Participants in the laboratory remembered
more information in the model-inconsistent condition (M ⫽ .75)
than in the model-consistent condition (M ⫽ .66). A plot of these
results is found in Figure 3, right panel.

Figure 3. Results of two-way ANCOVAs. Left panel shows results of the
two-way ANCOVA for the dependent variable aesthetic experience. Right
panel shows results of the two-way ANCOVA for the dependent variable
information retention. Both plots have the condition (consistent vs. inconsistent model order) that participants were in on the x-axis, the dependent
measure on the y-axis, and separate lines for the context (laboratory vs.
museum) that participants were in. Error bars in both plots reflect standard
errors. Note that the minimum value of aesthetic experience is 1 with a
maximum of 7. For information retention, the minimum is 0 and the
maximum is 1.

ratory) on aesthetic experience and information retention were
partly supported. As expected, there was a significant effect of
context on aesthetic experience, with people in the museum having
more enhanced aesthetic experience than people in the laboratory.
This contributes to the existing evidence showing that viewing
artworks in a museum context generally leads to enhanced aesthetic experiences (Brieber et al., 2014; Kirk, Skov, Hulme, Christensen, & Zeki, 2009; Locher et al., 1999; Tinio, Smith, & Smith,
2014). This finding may be qualified by the fact that context and
the way the art was presented (genuine artwork vs. reproduction)
were confounded. It seems appropriate to assume that part of this
effect is due to seeing the genuine artwork instead of the reproduction. However, in Kirk et al.’s (2009) study, context was
manipulated by the use of labels alone, which suggests that the
museum context does matter in and of itself and that a difference
between the genuine artwork and reproduction cannot fully explain
this effect.
The lack of an effect of model order on aesthetic experience
may be explained through Russell’s (2003) effort after meaning
theory, which proposes that giving participants information that
helps in the interpretation of an artwork makes the painting more
meaningful and enhances the hedonic value of the artwork. In
Study 2, participants in both conditions received the same information. Merely receiving this information alone may have enhanced participants’ aesthetic experiences, which may have cancelled out the more subtle effects of information structure.
Interestingly, and contrary to our hypothesis, there was an
interaction effect between model order and context on information
retention. This interaction reflects the idea that presenting information in a model-consistent order helps people remember the
information better (i.e., when they are in a museum). For people in
the laboratory, presenting information in a model-inconsistent
order helps them remember the information better. What seems to
be driving this effect is that information retention is especially low
for laboratory participants in the model-consistent condition. This
finding is best explained by the fact that laboratory participants

Discussion
Our hypotheses about the effects of model order (modelconsistent vs. model-inconsistent) and context (museum vs. labo-

5
Differences in degrees of freedom between statistical tests and the total
N of our sample are due to missing data.

This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.

DO YOU SEE WHAT I SEE?

saw a reproduction of the artwork that is inherently lower in visual
detail than the genuine artwork seen by the participants in the
museum. Because the audio guide in the model-consistent order
begins with a description of the visual details of the work, these
details were less clearly visible to the laboratory participants. The
audio guide also mentions that the work did not have a finishing
varnish, which makes the work look heavily textured and rough.
For laboratory participants, this information may have seemed less
relevant because they were not able to see such details mentioned
in the audio guide. This is in line with embodied theories of
cognition, according to which memories are consolidated better
when information can be grounded to concrete visual experiences
(Joy & Sherry, 2003; Wilson, 2002). However, for museum participants, this information may have been especially interesting
because they have been made aware of details that they have
initially processed automatically. This interaction between context
and information retention is also consistent with one of the key
findings in Study 1—that there is a low level of report, among
laboratory participants, on themes that correspond to the first stage
of the aesthetic experience, the stage associated with automatic
processing of visual details. Because museum participants were
able to explicitly experience visual details, the model-consistent
order of presenting information had a positive effect on information retention. This is consistent with the first hypothesis—namely,
that presenting information in the correct order leads participants
to remember information better.

General Discussion
Both studies contribute to our understanding of the Mirror
Model and the aesthetic experience of art, but in different ways.
The first study showed that the model is a relatively good reflection of how people naturally process art. Furthermore, it indicates
points of improvement for the model. The two main points of
improvement would be to include the concept of a motivation to
understand that is related to the first glance and to explicitly
incorporate the process of moving back and forth through the
stages of the model. Although aesthetic experience models (e.g.,
Leder et al., 2004) explicitly incorporate this possibility, no research to date has been done to directly test this. Therefore, it is
essential that more research is conducted to investigate this further
and to replicate our findings.
The second study showed that presenting information in a
manner that is consistent with the model may be dependent on the
manner in which artworks are presented, at least in terms of how
much information about the artworks people are able to remember.
What seems to be driving this effect is that information retention
is especially low for laboratory participants in the modelconsistent condition. When information is presented in a modelconsistent way, the visual details in a work are addressed first.
Because these visual details are inherently less discernable in a
reproduction (vs. a genuine artwork), people may be more likely to
disengage with the information they are hearing and thus remember less. This finding has implications for art-related education.
Art-related education could occur in the museum (e.g., during
guided tours or school field trips) and outside of the museum (e.g.,
during art education classes in school). Our findings suggest that it
is especially important to consider the way information is struc-
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tured when art-related education happens outside of the museum.
However, further research is needed to characterize this finding.
Study 2 also replicated the results of previous studies by finding
that experiencing art in a museum (vs. a laboratory) enhances
aesthetic experience. However, future research should tease apart
context and presentation setting as much as possible to investigate
the unique contribution of each. Nonetheless, this finding does
suggest that regardless of technical advances such as Google Art
Project, which lets you virtually visit museums, there is really
nothing like going to a museum.
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Appendix
Detailed Procedure and Materials
Audio Guide Text
Version 1 (inconsistent model order) . This painting, entitled
“The Senate,” was made by William Gropper circa 1950. In this
work, Gropper is trying to express his frustration with legislation
passed by the U.S. Senate. Gropper was sent by Vanity Fair to
observe the U.S. Senate in 1936. Afterward, he began portraying
his frustration with the legislation that they passed. The work you
are looking at now is one of a series of paintings depicting the
senate. The work deals with themes such as injustice and the
failure of democracy.
These themes are reflected in the stylistic aspects of the work
(for example, in the use of extreme gestures and postures). These
are most pronounced in the hands of the figures. For example, in
the left of the picture, there is a man whispering to another man.
The size of his hand is exaggerated, and the man next to the person
he’s whispering to has his hand twisted in an unnatural position,
which would be hard to achieve in real life. This emphasizes the
lack of engagement this figure feels with what is going on in the
picture. Similarly, the man to the right of the speaker is sitting
slumped on his desk. His elbows are sharply edged, making the
slump feel bigger, again emphasizing a lack of engagement. The
general composition follows a curved line, starting from the man
slumped on his desk toward the lower left corner of the picture,
creating a sense as if the figures could fall out of the picture

plane— essentially “pulling the carpet out from underneath.” Stylistically, the painting is expressionistic.
Gropper uses garish colors and harsh lighting to create a sense
of estrangement and a general sickening feeling. For example,
when you look at the carpet in the right corner of the painting,
Gropper has used a lot of brushstrokes and layering of colors. The
carpet inspires a dizzy and sickening feeling, which is also illustrated by the green faces of the figures. Even though the work is oil
on canvas, there are no smooth planes in the picture nor is there a
varnish finish, which results in the work looking heavily textured
and rough.
Version 2 (consistent model order). This painting, entitled
“The Senate,” was made by William Gropper circa 1950. It is an
oil on canvas painting. Even though the work is oil on canvas, if
you look at the painting you will see that there are no smooth
planes in the picture nor is there a varnish finish, which results in
the work looking heavily textured and rough. This is also created
by the use of color and application of the brushstrokes For example, when you look at the carpet in the right corner of the painting,
Gropper has used a lot of brushstrokes and layering of colors. The
carpet inspires a dizzy and sickening feeling, which is also illustrated by the green faces of the figures. Gropper uses garish colors
and harsh lighting to create a sense of estrangement and a general
sickening feeling.

(Appendix continues)
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Stylistically, the painting is expressionistic. The general
composition follows a curved line, starting from the man
slumped on his desk in the upper right corner toward the lower
left corner of the picture, creating a sense as if the figures could
fall out of the picture plane— essentially “pulling the carpet out
from underneath.” Another stylistic reoccurring feature is the
use of extreme gestures and postures. These are most pronounced in the hands of the figures. For example, in the left of
the picture, there is a man whispering to another man. The size
of his hand is exaggerated, and the man next to the person he’s
whispering to has his hand twisted in an unnatural position,
which would be hard to achieve in real life. This emphasizes the
lack of engagement this figure feels with what is going on in the
picture. Similarly, the man to the right of the speaker is sitting
slumped on his desk. His elbows are sharply edged, making the
slump feel bigger, again emphasizing a lack of engagement.
Together, these formal features such as exaggerated poses and
garish colors are used by Gropper to express his frustration with
legislation passed by the U.S. Senate, which is the general theme
of the work. Gropper was sent by Vanity Fair to observe the U.S.
Senate in 1936. Afterward, he began portraying his frustration with
the legislation that they passed. The work you are looking at now
is one of a series of paintings depicting the senate. The work deals
with themes such as injustice and the failure of democracy.
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Aesthetic Experience Scale
When looking at the artwork to what extent did you . . .
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

feel absorbed and immersed
completely lose track of time
feel chills down your spine
get goose bumps
feel like you’re somewhere else
feel like your hair is standing on end
feel like crying
feel touched
feel detached from your surroundings
feel a sense of awe and wonder

Note: All items are rated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very
much).

Information Retention Questionnaire
Instructions: You have listened to an audio clip telling you
about the artwork. Below are statements about the artwork. For
each statement, please indicate whether you remember hearing the
statement or not. Please note that some of the statements were
presented in the audio clip while some were not. Mark your answer
by circling “yes” or “no.”
Do you remember that . . .

Aesthetic Fluency Scale
How much do you know about the following artists/art ideas:

1.

. . . the painting is oil on canvas yes/no

2.

. . . the style of the painting is Impressionistic yes/no

3.

. . . Gropper was sent by Vanity Fair to observe the U.S.
Senate yes/no

4.

. . . the composition of the artwork forms a triangle
shape yes/no

5.

. . . examples of stylistic features in the painting are
exaggerated hands and postures yes/no

6.

. . . the painting is part of a series of artworks depicting
the U.S. Senate yes/no

7.

. . . the painting celebrates the workings of the U.S.
Senate yes/no

8.

. . . Gropper uses garish colors and harsh lighting yes/no

9.

. . . the artwork deals with themes such as injustice
yes/no

10.

. . . in the painting, Gropper uses few brushstrokes and
colors yes/no

• 0 —I have never heard of this artist or term
• 1—I have heard of this but do not really know anything
about it
• 2—I have a vague idea of what this is
• 3—I understand this artist or idea when it is discussed
• 4 —I can talk intelligently about this artist or idea in art
• Mary Cassatt
• Isamu Noguchi
• John Singer Sargent
• Alessandro Boticelli
• Gian Lorenzo Bernini
• Fauvism
• Funerary Stelae
• Impressionism
• Chinese Scrolls
• Abstract Expressionism

Note: All bolded items are reverse-scored items.
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